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J I J R i S D K ""["JOIN iW AIM'KLLATU C O U R T
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal
under I Jtah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) and pursuant an Order of the I Itah Supreme Court
entered! Jclober i, liiW1^

ISSl JES P R E S E N T E D F O R R E V IK W
I.

Did the Trial Court Correct!) Rule that McQueen Cannot Reoo\tT AHorne)
Fees Under the Promissory Notes or the Trust Deed?
Standard 01 ive\ie^

,.*,-.

, »

question ol" law which ihn « ouri reviews loi correctness. Cttfe Rio I/u. et m. v. LarkinGiffbrd-Overton, LLC, 2009 I IT 27, \1 \, 20" I1 u! i 2
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below h\ N K UIK en s Motion
v ai d of ( \ tt 3i i icy Fees ai id Expei ises dated Novel t: lbei 3 2008,
However, McQueen now claims attorney fees based 'upon Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-5-82<>. which was not preserved below
II.

Did the Trial Court Correctly Rule that McQueen Cannot Reco\ er Attorney
Fees Against the Guarantors of the Promissory Notes?
Standaa* -.«* \w s tew i 1 1: ic ti la.! coi irt's interpret;!^ J. -n a contract presents a

questioi- oflau which this l ourt rc\ic\\s lor correctness. Cafe Rio, hie, et ai v LarkinGiffora (h\rh>>> < * . = "!l- •- \

r

*. . •• ,\ ••: .

Pi eservation Below .:; 1 1 lis issi K w aspreserv edbelo\ v i;i:i]\ 1c Qi i i en' sl\ loti :»ii
for Award of Attorney Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors dated December 19, 2008.

1
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IIL

Did the Trial Court Make the Requisite Finding to Support an Award of
Discovery Sanctions?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "the legal sufficiency of factual

findings . . . under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the
trial court." Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ^[14, 217 P.3d 733.
Preservation Below:

This issue was preserved below by PC Crane's

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions dated July 28,
2008.
IV.

Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion with Regard to the Amount of
Discovery Sanctions Awarded Against PC Crane?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the award of discovery sanctions

under an abuse of discretion standard. Bodell Construction Co. v. Robbins, et aL, 2009
UT52,^jl6,215P.3d933.
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below by McQueen's Second
Motion for Sanctions dated June 24,2008, and by PC Crane's Memorandum in Opposition to
that Motion dated July 28, 2008.
V.

Was the Amount of the Trial Court's Award of Costs to McQueen Proper?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to award

costs to the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard. Jensen v. Sawyers, et aL,
2005 UT 81,1J140, 130 P.3d 325.

2
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P r e s e r v a t i o n Below: I t ' ("lane preserved Ihis issue helmv h\ ils < ^huxiu HI lo
V< idli* u I Mr A • anduin of Costs dated Jul} 6,2009 and a Reply M e m o r a n d u m L Support of
the Objection a u e d August 7, 2009.

N S T I T U T I O N A L I J RO\'1S1CHNS, S'l'A'I'U'l'KS, UR1)INAIN( T'N
mstiti itional, stati itor> „ or other provisions are determinative or of central
importance to this appeal.

S 1 A 1 E M E N T Q F T H E

• .

A.

CASE •

IN ill HIlii-i ill IIIIIii" l 'use.
This was a breach of contract case arising from two transactions for the sale of

construction cranes, related equipment and goodwill. The parties entered contracts in 2004
and :uu> as I L ** ; i i \ .; ... m.*;.. J ^ . K .
v ,^r-.. -»• "• - '•••;. !•!*• :?

z f iled si lit in l tl tc: Disti lot. Coi irt in

*

- Tesentation, ai id other causes of action.

1 he causes o i action oubuniiwd iu the j ur) w a c . ( i ; breach of contract relating to each of the
* * • • purchase agreements identified below, and (2) misrepresentation in the formation of each
oi ic: (R 3316- 3320)
Hie issues in this appeal and cross-appeal lelatc iuiuhn:.w made I the District
Court after trial and are not based upon any rulings m<tde before or during tna »>t upon the
jury's verdict

1

McQueen regular!;)/ contends 1 i e \ \ as si led foi frai id I "''C Ci at ic i lever asserted ai ry cai iseol *

.'ii'iioii lor fraud
3
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B,

Course of Proceedings.
The case went to trial in October 2008. The jury found in favor of McQueen

on all of PC Crane's claims. Afterward McQueen sought and obtained the recusal of the
Honorable L.A. Dever who had presided over the case from the beginning. The Honorable
Robin W. Reese was then assigned to the case. McQueen then pursued his Motions for
Attorney Fees and a ruling on two pending discovery Motions that had been filed but not
ruled upon before trial.
C.

Disposition Below.
McQueen sought a ruling on four Motions which were heard by Judge Reese

on March 31, 2009. In chronological order of filing the Motions were:
a.

Defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions, dated June 24,2008.

(R. 2218-2219)2
b.

Defendants' Motion for Award of and Determination of the

Amount of Attorney' s Fees to be Awarded to McQueen in Connection with Discovery
Motions, dated June 27, 2008. (R. 2359-2380)
c.

Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses,

dated November 3, 2008. (R. 3477-3514)
d.

Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney' s Fees and Expenses

Against Guarantors, dated December 19, 2008. (R. 3842-3849)

2

The record indicates this Motion is missing from the District Court's file. (See
R. 2218-2219) Copies of the Motion and the supporting Memorandum are attached as
Addendum 1 for the convenience of the Court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1).
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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1 lu I)I"IMI'| Coiul ikiiiat the l'»'l ln<» M' 'linn-. In Killing enlnrd April 15,
1

:

' H)4-3y 1 Oj It denied the second Motion and granted the first in a Ruling entered

April 29 ? 2009,

->

^911-3915)

Both Ralings \\ ere memorialized in an Order on

Outstanding Motions entered June 2 \ 31111'"' |R, ^).^ i wi.0) I lie Disinci < HUM entered
lm;il liidgincnl nn Angus.! JI 'III!' «!•! W71 V)7<» 'IhuvafU'i !V1k t hiren 11 led his Notice
of Appeal and PC Crane filed its Notice of Cross™Appeal.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FA( t s
A,

Sales <<

<*.•

1.

agreement dated October 18,2004, McQueen agreed to sell three

cranes to PC Crane and k Jelivu the goodwill associated with them. The agreement
contains no provision for attorney foes, (R 3.580-3595)
2.
K ^ ^in!vr "* *uu/. iiic Oidci did not create a right to attorney lees. VK. , . ^ . .33)
3.

In another agreement dated March 2 1 2005. \k Queen agreed to sell n

fourth crane and to deliver the goou,• •: in,.,ia;vM .. -

, nai agreement ilso does nnl

pi: o\ ide for attorney fees (R 3597 3605) II lesetw oc c fill act s are collectrv e!>< referred to as
the "Purchase Agreements."
4.

PC Crane brought suit alleging McQueen failed to deliver goodwill as

required b> the Purchase Agreements, ai id to recovei as dan lages tt le good^v > > ill payi i lei its
MKule I i M» < hit HI luidt i tin1 Puiehiisr \ puvtiients.

5
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5.

The vast majority of the amounts due under the Purchase Agreements

was paid to McQueen by Zions Bank and Jordan Federal Credit Union from loans issued to
PC Crane. Plaintiffs also signed separate promissory notes with McQueen to pay for part of
the equipment and for goodwill.
6.

The two promissory notes relevant to this Motion are as follows:
a.

Promissory Note dated October 18, 2004 in the amount of

$228,800 (the "$228,800 Note"). (R. 3607-3609)
b.

Promissory Note dated March 21, 2005 in the amount of

$177,600 (the "$177,600 Note"). (R. 3611-3615)
7.

The $228,000 Note and the $ 177,600 Note are collectively referred to as

the "Promissory Notes." The Promissory Notes each have a limited attorney fee clause.
8.

PC Crane also signed a Security Agreement dated March 21,2005. The

Security Agreement does not provide for attorney fees. (R. 3617-3620)
9.

Plaintiff Lacy, LLC ("Lacy") also signed a Deed of Trust on April 15,

2005 (the "Trust Deed") as security for the Promissory Notes. The Trust Deed has a limited
attorney fee clause. (R. 3622-3627)
10.

The only claims submitted to the jury were based upon the Purchase

Agreements. (R. 3316-3320)
B.

Promissory Notes, Default Provisions.
11.

McQueen relies almost exclusively on the Promissory Notes for his

attorney fees claim. (R. 3477-3514)
6
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12.

The Promissory Notes each have nearly identical language requiring

both: (a) a "default" and (b) an enforcement action, as conditions to any right to claim
attorney fees.
13.

The term "default" is defined in each of the Promissory Notes with five

possible events of default being enumerated in paragraphs 2.1 through 2.5 as follows:
a.

Paragraph 2.1 - default occurs if PC Crane "fails to make any

payment under this Promissory Note on the date due of such payment."
b.

Paragraph 2.2 - default occurs if PC Crane "becomes insolvent

[or] a receiver is appointed," "makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors," files
a "voluntary petition in bankruptcy," or is "the subject of an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy."
c.

Paragraph 2.3 - default occurs if a payment default happens

under any other promissory note.
d.

Paragraph 2.4 - default occurs if a default happens with respect

to the Trust Deed.
e.

Paragraph 2.5 - default occurs if a default happens under the

Security Agreement.
(R. 3607-3608, 3611-3612)
14.

Paragraph 3 titled "Remedies" in each of the Promissory Notes then

states as follows: "In the event of a default under the Promissory Note, Holder [s], at its

7
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[their] option, may take one or more of the following actions" to enforce the Promissory
Note. (R. 3608, 3612 (emphasis added))
15.

The possible enforcement actions are described in paragraph 3.1 titled

"Acceleration and Legal Action." It provides as follows:
Declare the entire unpaid principal balance of the debt
evidenced hereby, and all interest on such debt and all other
costs and expenses evidenced hereby, to be immediately due and
payable, notwithstanding any other provision hereof, and
commence legal action for collection and enforcement of the
Promissory Note, including all costs and reasonable attorneys
fees incurred in connection therewith.
(R. 3608, 3612 (emphasis added)) Thus, McQueen may only claim attorney fees as part of
such an enforcement action.
C.

No Event of Default Occurred.
16.

PC Crane was never in default under either of the Promissory Notes. As

described below, PC Crane fully paid McQueen all principal and interest due under the
Promissory Notes in accordance with the parties' Stipulation and the Orders of the District
Court.
17.

The $228,800 Note required monthly payments through September 30,

2007 and then a lump sum due on October 30, 2007. (R. 3607-3609) The $177,600 Note
required monthly payments through March 1, 2008 with a lump sum due on April 1, 2008.
(R. 3611-3615)
18.

The parties signed a Stipulation on November 26, 2007 which was

approved by the Court in an Order entered November 30, 2007.
8
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The Stipulation

acknowledges that the only payment left under the $228,800 Note was the lump sum payment
due on October 30, 2007. (R. 3629-3632)
19.

McQueen's counsel agreed to the Stipulation in principle before

October 30, 2007, but the written form was not signed until November. (R. 3629-3632)
20.

The Stipulation then states that none of the Plaintiffs "shall be required

to make any further payments on the $228,800 Note prior to the entry of afinaljudgment in
the above-captioned case." (R. 3630)
21.

The Stipulation also provides that PC Crane would continue to make

monthly payments under the $177,600 Note through March 2008, but that none of the
"Plaintiffs shall be required to make any payments other than said prescribed monthly
payments on the $177,600 Note until the entry of a final judgment in the above-captioned
case." (R. 3630-3631)
22.

PC Crane timely made all monthly payments required by each of the

Promissory Notes and by the Stipulation and Order of November 2007. (R. 2357)
23.

McQueen did not contend otherwise, and instead argued that filing the

action below was a default under the Promissory Notes: "This action does not differ in
substance from a suit to enforce the Notes by McQueen with the plaintiffs defending based
on a failure of consideration - the parties are merely reversed ...." (R. 3483)
24.

By the Stipulation, the Defendants also agreed not to declare a default or

take any other action to enforce the Promissory Notes until afinaljudgment is entered. The
Stipulation reads as follows:
9
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Defendants agree to stay any action to foreclose, enforce,
collect, or otherwise declare the Plaintiffs or Lacy Limited
Liability Company in default of their obligations under the
$228,800 Note and the $177,600 Note, including recording any
notice of default, reporting any default to any credit agency, or
taking any other action under either Note prior to the entry of a
final judgment in the aboye-captioned case ....
(R. 3631 (emphasis added))
25.

The Order approves the Stipulation in all respects and also prohibits the

Defendants from taking "any action to foreclose, enforce, collect, or otherwise declare the
Plaintiffs or Lacy Limited Liability Company in default of their obligations under the
$228,800 Note and the $177,600 Note .,.." (R. 3635-3636 (emphasis added))
26.

The record reflects that no default occurred under any other provision of

either of the Promissory Notes, and McQueen does not contend that any other kind of default
occurred. (R. 3477-3514; Brief of Appellants at 42-49.)
27.

McQueen did not serve a notice of default or declare the unpaid

principal balance due and payable under either of the Promissory Notes. (R. 2357)
D.

No Enforcement Action Taken.
28.

McQueen also did not commence any legal action to enforce either of

the Promissory Notes or to recover costs and attorney fees. McQueen's Counterclaim only
sought reformation of the Purchase Agreement dated October 18, 2004, which claim was
fully satisfied by the Court's Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment entered
November 2, 2007. (R. 3580-95)
29.

The Counterclaim asserted no other cause of action. (R. 106-110)
10
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30.

McQueen filed no other legal action and did not pursue any other right

or remedy in connection with either of the Promissory Notes,
E,

Court's Order, Promissory Notes Paid Off.
31.

The Promissory Notes were paid off pursuant to an Order of the District

Court. In a series of events only summarized here, PC Crane had to seek an Order allowing it
to pay off the Promissory Notes and to obtain a release of the Trust Deed. McQueen
contested the payoff before the District Court and further challenged it by Petition to the Utah
Supreme Court. (R. 2812-2813)
32.

PC Crane then paid the balance of the $228,800 Note with a check dated

August 27, 2008 in the amount of $133,666.87. (R. 3647) McQueen Crane Services, LLC
accepted and cashed the check.
33.

On the same day PC Crane paid the balance of the $ 177,600 Note with a

check for $159,352.48. (R. 3648) McQueen Masonry, Inc. accepted and cashed the check.
34.

At trial, James L. McQueen testified he had been paid in full for all

principal and interest due under the Promissory Notes. He further testified PC Crane had
made all payments in accordance with the Promissory Notes, the Stipulation, and the Court's
Order.
35.

The Promissory Notes were not the subject of this litigation. The

Complaint alleged McQueen failed to deliver goodwill as promised in the Purchase
Agreements dated October 18, 2004 and March 21, 2005, and sought a judgment requiring

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the return of all goodwill payments with interest. (R. 12-14, 20-24) No cause of action
challenged the validity of the Promissory Notes. (R. 1-25)
36.

The only claims submitted to the jury were breach of contract as to the

Purchase Agreements and material misrepresentation in the formation of the Purchase
Agreements. No issue was submitted to the jury concerning either of the Promissory Notes.
(R. 3650-3654)
37.

As to each Purchase Agreement the jury found PC Crane had fully

performed all of its obligations. (R. 3651-3652)
F,

Discovery Regarding Trailer Modifications.
38.

McQueen sought overly broad discovery about trailer modifications in

an attempt to show that PC Crane had dealings with a crane broker named Lon Stam
("Stam") earlier than alleged.
39.

McQueen believed PC Crane and its counsel were lying to the

Defendants and to the Court. (Addendum 1, McQueen Memo at 8-9.) McQueen pursued
extensive discovery in a tireless effort to prove his theory.
40.

Stam is a crane broker in Utah who worked with McQueen for several

years before the Purchase Agreements were signed. Nearly all of the customers who rented
McQueen's cranes had a long business relationship with Stam, but hardly knew McQueen.
The goodwill McQueen agreed to deliver consisted mainly of those customer relationships.

3

PC Crane had good reason to be concerned about too much documentation being produced
to McQueen who remained a potential competitor in the crane rental business. (R. 4002,
T. 39-40)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

PC Crane alleged that Stam, not McQueen, had those business relationships, and that
McQueen withheld that information when the Purchase Agreements were signed.
41.

PC Crane representatives testified they did not learn about Stam's

relationship with the McQueen customers until shortly after the second Purchase Agreement
was signed in March 2005. (See R. 2423)
42.

In a loan application to the Bank of American Fork over a year later in

April 2006, PC Crane said it "collaborated" with Stam "in the building of a custom designed
trailer" to be used with a crane known as the "300." (R. 2464-2469)
43.

McQueen contended this "custom designed trailer" is the same one PC

Crane modified in March 2005, referred to as the Fontaine. (Addendum 1, McQueen Memo
at 7.) The record shows they cannot be the same trailer.
G.

The Fontaine Trailer.
44.

Cranes must be used with counter weights and one or more semi-trailers

are needed to carry the counter weights to a job site. (R. 2415)
45.

One of the cranes bought from McQueen in 2004 was known as the

"165." (R. 2471) However, PC Crane did not buy McQueen's semi-trailer for the 165.
(R. 2415)
46.

Instead PC Crane bought a 1996 Fontaine trailer (the "Fontaine") on

March 9, 2005 to carry the 165 counter weights. (R. 2475, 2481)
47.

Vernon Belcher ("Vera") made some modifications to the Fontaine by

adding a third axle, moving the other two axles, and making related changes. UDOT
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representatives helped Vern design the modifications.

No one else was involved.

(R. 2475-2476)
48.

Vern then hired Precision Truck and Trailer Repair, Inc. in Salt Lake

City to finish the modifications (R. 2477), and the work was completed on or about April 8,
2005. (R. 2508-2509)
49.

Stam was not involved with the modifications to the Fontaine or any of

the design work. (R. 2485-2486)
50.

Vern testified the reason for modifying the Fontaine was "exclusively"

to carry the three counter weights for the 165.

(R. 2476, 2505)

Even after these

modifications the Fontaine could carry no more than 51,000 pounds. (R. 2476)
51.

PC Crane also bought a crane from McQueen known as the "300" which

requires four counter weights. The 300 is a much larger crane than the 165 and was also
purchased in October 2004. (R. 2511)
52.

The Fontaine could carry the counter weights for the 165 but could not

carry the counter weights for the 300 (R. 2488), which weigh about 69,000 pounds.
(R.2502)
53.

Vern testified the 300 counter weights were "too much weight for the

Fontaine." (R. 2476) Stam also testified "it's not possible to modify [the Fontaine] in such a
way as to carry all three counterweights for the 300-ton." (R. 2488)
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H.

Collaborations About a Custom Designed Trailer.
54.

Paul Belcher ("Paul") testified he had discussions with Stam about

"some way designing a trailer that would allow us to facilitate using a 300-ton as a smaller
crane." (R. 2502)
55.

PC Crane had to "down rent" the 300 on several occasions, i.e. rent it

for use as a smaller crane, so Paul was trying to find a way to "more cost effectively down
rent it." PC Crane would need a single trailer that could haul the "three counter weights" for
the 300 which "totaled out to 69,000 pounds ...." (R. 2502)
56.

Paul does not remember when those discussions took place, but the

document referencing them was used with a loan application to the Bank of American Fork
in April 2006. (R. 2357)
5 7.

The custom designed trailer mentioned in the loan application ultimately

was never built. It "never became a feasible option" because as time passed PC Crane no
longer needed to down rent the 300. (R. 2502, 2504)
5 8.

The loan was never issued because PC Crane found financing through a

leasing company. (R. 2357)
I.

PC Crane's Discovery Responses and Communications.
59.

At a hearing before Judge Dever on March 4,2008, PC Crane stated the

Fontaine was different from the "custom designed trailer." The transcript reads as follows:
THE COURT:
What about this Exhibit No. 3 and the one he just
gave us today, which is PC-273, where it talks about this drop-deck
trailer payment on March 29th?
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MR. BARNECK:

Yes.

THE COURT:
Isn't that something that shows that you were
working on some sort of a trailer?
MR. BARNECK:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Is that the trailer [at] issue?

MR. BARNECK: No. And if counsel had asked in depositions, they
would have been told that Vern Belcher did this one on his own. PC
Crane wanted a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to create one.
This was for a different crane. It was for the 165 Liebherr. The one
that Counsel's complaining about from the loan documents was for the
300. Different crane.
(R. 4002, T. 39)
60.

Judge Dever himself questioned the purpose of the additional discovery

McQueen requested, and noted that the Fontaine is a different trailer from the "custom
designed trailer" referenced in the document at issue. (R. 2463-2469) The Court asked
McQueen's counsel:
THE COURT: I guess the question is is [sic] that, if they produce to
you the invoices or whatever it is for these repairs of [the Fontaine],
which is not the trailer that's at issue, . . . and you want to have
discovery about what? The [Fontaine] trailer that the invoices say was
repaired, when we know that, according to what you have and the
information you have, is not the trailer that's at issue here?
(R. 4002, T. 73 (emphasis added))
61.

The Fontaine was purchased and modified in March and April 2005.

(R. 2475, 2481, 2508-2509) The "custom designed trailer" was an idea discussed later
between Paul and Stam but ultimately was never built because it was no longer needed.
(R. 2502-2504)
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62.

These facts support the statements of Mr. Burghardt at the September 5,

2007 hearing that the "collaboration" was in 2006 (R. 2659-2660), which McQueen
challenges as inaccurate. (R. 2812-2813; see Addendum 1.)
J.

Order in Limine Re: Trailer Evidence.
63.

Despite the extensive discovery about trailer collaborations and

modifications, much of that information was inadmissible as evidence at trial.
64.

At the beginning of trial the District Court entered an Order on

Plaintiffs5 Motion in Limine Re: Evidence of Trailer Modifications. (R. 3269-3272)
65.

The admissible evidence was limited to (a) collaborations between PC

Crane and Lon Stam relating to the modification of a trailer, and (b) the loan application
document if relevant to challenge witness credibility. (R. 3270)
K.

District Court's Finding.
66.

In its Ruling on McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, the District

Court made the following finding:
The Court finds that Plaintiffs position on March 26,
2008, that the trailer had never been built, was inconsistent with
Plaintiffs5 previous position that the trailer had existed, there
was just no documentation regarding the trailer. Based upon the
inconsistency of Plaintiffs position, the Court holds that
sanctions are appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions.
(R. 3913-3914 (emphasis added))
67.

Neither the Court's Ruling entered April 29,2009 nor its Order entered

June 23, 2009 made a finding that PC Crane acted willfully or in bad faith, was at fault, or
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acted with persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. (R. 3911-3915,
3933-3936)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
McQueen is not entitled to attorney fees under the Promissory Notes, either
against the obligors or the guarantors. Attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by
statute or contract, and are allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract.
The attorney fee provisions in the Promissory Notes require both (a) a default by PC Crane
and (b) an enforcement action by McQueen. The term "default" is defined in detail in the
Promissory Notes, and the District Court correctly found PC Crane did not default under
either of the Notes. Moreover, it is clear that McQueen did not take any enforcement action
against PC Crane, and could not do so because of the Stipulation and Order of November
2007.
The Purchase Agreements were the subj ect of PC Crane's claims in the District
Court and neither one contains an attorney fee clause. McQueen tries to characterize the case
as a challenge to the Promissory Notes, to support his claim for attorney fees. However, the
Promissory Notes are separate agreements and the fee provisions in the Notes cannot apply to
an action claiming breach of the Purchase Agreements. Moreover, even if attorney fee
provisions could be effectively transferred from one contract to another, the jury found that
PC Crane fully complied with all of its obligations under the Purchase Agreements.
This Court should also reject McQueen's claim for attorney fees under the
Trust Deed and on other common law grounds, for the reasons set forth in the Rulings of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

District Court. McQueen also raises a new issue on this appeal claiming attorney fees under
Utah's reciprocal statute at Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. McQueen did not properly
preserve this issue for appeal. Moreover, the claim fails on the merits because the only
contractual attorney fee provisions in the case are in favor of McQueen, not PC Crane.
The District Court incorrectly based its sanctions award on the finding of
"inconsistent" positions by PC Crane during discovery. A mere inconsistency is insufficient
to support an award of discovery sanctions, and Utah law plainly requires a finding of
willfulness, bad faith, persistent dilatory tactics, or other intentional fault. The District Court
made no such finding, nor was there a basis for one, and the award of sanctions should be
reversed.
Alternatively, the small amount awarded by the District Court should be
affirmed. Judge Reese made clear that he intended the scope of the award to be very limited.
The District Court is granted a great deal of deference in determining the amount of a
sanctions award, and McQueen has failed to show a clear abuse of discretion.
Finally, the District Court's award of costs should be reduced by eliminating
the expenses for depositions not used in any meaningful way at trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
McQueen appeals the District Court's denial of his motion for attorney fees by
challenging the interpretation of contracts between the parties, including the Promissory
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Notes, the Trust Deed, and the Purchase Agreements. The standard of review for this part of
McQueen's appeal is correctness under which the Court gives no deference to the trial
court's interpretation. Cafe Rio, Inc., et al v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27,
<[|21, 207 P.3d 1235. McQueen also challenges the District Court's rejection of his claim for
attorney fees against the guarantors of the Promissory Notes. This argument challenges the
interpretation of the same contracts as well as the Guaranty dated April 14, 2005. The
standard of review for this part of McQueen's appeal is also correctness. Cafe Rio, 2009
UT 27, at ^21.
The majority of McQueen's Brief, however, challenges the amount of the
District Court's discovery sanctions included in the Order on Outstanding Motions entered
June 23, 2009. (R. 3933-3936) This Court reviews the award of discovery sanctions under
an abuse of discretion standard. Bode 11 Construction Co. v. Robbins, etaL, 2009 UT 52, ^[16,
215P.3d933.
In its cross-appeal PC Crane challenges the grounds for the award of sanctions,
and argues the District Court made no finding that PC Crane's conduct merited sanctions.
This Court reviews "the legal sufficiency of factual findings" under a "correction-of-error
standard" giving no deference to the trial court. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ^ 14,
217P.3d733.
The second issued raised on PC Crane's cross-appeal is the amount of costs
awarded to McQueen. The trial court's decision to award costs to the prevailing party is
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reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Jensen v. Sawyers, etal, 2005 UT 81, ^[140,
130P.3d325.

POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DENIAL OF McOUEEN'S
MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
A,

McQueen is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees Under the Promissory Notes.
Under Utah law attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or

contract. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, et al, 2002 UT 11, ^[17, 40 P.3d 1119; Bonneville
Distributing Co. v. Green River Development Associates, Inc., e?a/.,2007UTApp 175?^|42,
164 P.3d 433. "Fees provided for by contract, moreover, are allowed only in strict
accordance with the terms of the contract." IHC Health Services, Inc. v.D& K Management,
Inc., 2008 UT 73, ^[39, 196 P.3d 588 {quotingFoote, et al. v. Clark, etal, 962 P.2d 52, 54
(Utah 1998)); Bonneville Distributing, 2007 UT App 175, at f!2.
Cases applying these principles demonstrate that attorney fees are awarded only
when the circumstances of the case come within the language of the specific provision in
question. In IHC Health Services, the trial court ruled that IHC properly terminated its lease
with the tenant and also awarded attorney fees to IHC. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed all other rulings but reversed the award of attorney fees based upon a strict reading
of the lease provisions. Section 17.2 of the lease allowed recovery of attorney fees regardless
whether the action was instituted during the term of the lease, but IHC waived this right by
voluntarily dismissing its claim under Section 17.2 and relying exclusively on Section 23 for
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its attorney fees claim. IHCHealth Services, 2008 UT 73, atffi[41-42.However, Section 23
of the lease provided for attorney fees only if the action was instituted during the term of the
lease. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the term of the lease ended when IHC sent a notice
of default more than a year before filing its complaint. Therefore, IHC could not recover
under Section 23 and the Court reversed the award of fees. Id. at f43.
The result in IHC Health Services follows the stated rule of interpretation that
attorney fees under a contract provision are allowed "only in strict accordance with the terms
of the contract." Id. at ^39. See also Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, et al.9 830 P.2d 266 (Utah
1992) (reversing award of attorney fees incurred in recovering rent for holdover period
because in that claim landlord "was not seeking to enforce the terms of the lease").
In Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., et al, 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, the
Utah Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of attorney fees under a similar default
provision because the plaintiff was not a defaulting party. The Court first cited the governing
standard that fees provided for by contract "'are allowed only in strict accordance with the
terms of the contract.'" Id. at ^[73 (quoting Foote, 962 P.2d at 54). The terms of the contract
at issue required that there be a defaulting party for attorney fees to be awarded. Giusti, 2009
UT 2, at f73. The plaintiff had filed suit against the defendants alleging several claims
including breach of contract. Id. at f 12. All of the plaintiffs claims were resolved in favor
of the defendants. Id. at f 13. The defendants then filed a motion for attorney fees which was
denied by the district court. Id. at ^[14. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
attorney fees and held there was no default under the contract at issue, and therefore no basis
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for an award of attorney fees. Id. at ^73. The case now on appeal followed the same course
of proceedings as Giusti and should also reach the same result.
This Court also recently held that an award of attorney fees may only be made
"in strict accordance with" the terms of the contract. Jones, et al v Riche, et al, 2009 UT
App 196, \2,216 P.3d 357 (quoting Giusti, 2009 UT 2, at f73). The Court ruled as follows:
When a contract requires, as this one does, that the
defaulting party pay attorney fees, "the sole criterion for [a
party] to obtain attorney fees . . . is to show default by the other
contract party.55
Id. at p (quoting Foote, 962 P.2d at 54-55). The jury found that the Riches breached the
contract. This Court concluded the Riches were the defaulting parties and therefore reversed
the award of attorney fees. Jones, 2009 UT App 196, at %$.
In Dale K. Barker Co. v. Bushnell, et al, 2009 UT App 385, 222 P.3d 1188,
this Court also affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney fees because the claim was not
based upon the contract provision. Defendant Bushnell filed a third party complaint against
Barker, individually, claiming the "equitable doctrine of alter ego" would allow him to
"pierce the corporate veil of Barker Company and impose on Barker personal liability" for
any judgment in favor of Bushnell. The Court held that the claim was based on an alter ego
theory and not on the contract. Id. at %5. Therefore, Barker was not entitled to an award of
attorney fees for his successful defense of the third party complaint.
These authorities require the same result in this case. It is clear from
paragraph 3 of the Promissory Notes that any right to claim attorney fees is contingent, first,
upon the occurrence of a default. The language states: "In the event of a default. . ." the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
23may contain errors.
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holder(s) of the Promissory Notes may take one or more of the actions identified. (R. 3608,
3612 (emphasis added)) The District Court correctly ruled that no default occurred with
respect to the Promissory Notes. PC Crane timely paid all monthly payments under the
Promissory Notes. Balloon payments were deferred based upon McQueen's Stipulation and
the Court's Order (R. 3630-3631, 3635-3636), and were later paid pursuant to the Order of
August 7, 2008. (R. 3647-3648) It is also clear that no other type of default specified in
paragraph 2 occurred. There was no insolvency and no default under the Deed of Trust, the
Security Agreement, or any other note. Because there was no default, the District Court
correctly ruled that McQueen could not recover attorney fees.
The gist of McQueen's position is that PC Crane effectively defaulted under
the Promissory Notes by filing the action for breach of the Purchase Agreements. (Aplts. Br.
at 44-45.) However, from paragraph 2 of the Promissory Notes it is clear that filing an action
does not constitute a "default." The five possible events of default are clearly defined and do
not include an action for breach of the Purchase Agreements.
Moreover, even if a default had occurred, a further condition to a claim for
attorney fees required McQueen to commence legal action for collection and enforcement of
the Notes including costs and attorney fees incurred. (R. 3608, 3612) The facts show
McQueen never did so. (R. 3907) Indeed, the Stipulation and Order explicitly prohibited
McQueen from taking "any action to ... declare the Plaintiffs ... in default of their
obligations under" the Promissory Notes or taking "any other action under either Note prior
to the entry of a final judgment in the above-captioned case . . . ." (R. 3631, 3636)
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Therefore, McQueen also cannot satisfy the second condition required by the Promissory
Notes.
Finally, the District Court also ruled that even if PC Crane was in default for
not paying the lump sums on the dates specified in the Promissory Notes, McQueen still was
not entitled to attorney fees. McQueen "specifically waived any right to act upon the default
in the Stipulation." (R. 3907) In the Stipulation McQueen agreed "to stay any action to
foreclose, enforce, collect, or otherwise declare the Plaintiffs . . . in default of their
obligations" under the Promissory Notes. (R. 3631) Waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. Soter 's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 857 P.2d 935,940
(Utah 1993). By signing the Stipulation and submitting it for the District Court's approval,
McQueen knowingly relinquished the right to declare a default based upon the deferral of
lump sum payments.
For these reasons this Court should affirm the judgment below and rule that
McQueen is not entitled to attorney fees under the Promissory Notes.
B.

The Purchase Agreements Have No Attorney Fee Clause.
It is obvious here that neither of the Purchase Agreements have an attorney fee

clause and McQueen is not entitled to attorney fees for the successful defense of an action on
the Purchase Agreements. PC Crane alleged McQueen breached the Purchase Agreements
by failing to deliver goodwill and that he misrepresented facts when the Purchase
Agreements were signed. Those were the only claims submitted to the jury. (R. 3316-3320)
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All other claims alleged in the Complaint were also based on the Purchase Agreements or
were tort claims. (R. 1-25)
Because the Purchase Agreements have no attorney fee clause, McQueen tries
to make the Court believe this action was in reality a suit to rescind the Promissory Notes.
(Aplts. Br. at 44-45.) The cases cited above, however, make clear that Utah courts only
allow fee claims if they strictly conform to the language of the contract. PC Crane has found
no authority, nor has McQueen cited any, holding that a fee provision in one contract can be
effectively transferred to another contract to support an attorney fee claim. Although the
Promissory Notes are related to the Purchase Agreements, they are separate and distinct
instruments. The best evidence of their separateness is the fact that these parties chose not to
include attorney fee provisions in the Purchase Agreements but did include them in the
Promissory Notes. Because the Purchase Agreements have no fee provisions this Court
should affirm the District Court's denial of McQueen's claim for attorney fees.
Moreover, even if the attorney fee clauses in the Promissory Notes could be
transferred to the Purchase Agreements, it is clear that PC Crane committed no breach or
default under the Purchase Agreements.

The jury specifically found that PC Crane

performed all of its obligations under Purchase Agreements. (R. 3316-3320).
C.

McQueen Raises a New Issue.
McQueen raises a new issue for the first time on this appeal contending that

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 supports an award of attorney fees here. This issue was not
raised in the District Court and therefore has not been properly preserved for appeal. To
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preserve an issue for appeal it must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial
court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. 438 Main Street, et al v. Easy Heat, Inc., et
al9 2004 UT 72,1J51, 99 P.3d 801; Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, Inc., 2010 UT
App 9,^10, 223 P.3d 1141.
McQueen did not make a claim in the District Court for attorney fees based
upon § 78B-5-826. It was not raised in McQueen's Answer and Counterclaim (R. 97-117),
his Motions for Award of Attorney Fees (R. 3477-3514), or in his arguments to the District
Court. (R. 4003). McQueen made reference to the statute in a footnote of a reply
memorandum (R. 3668), but did not present the issue in such a way that the District Court
had an opportunity to rule on it. Accordingly, the issue was not preserved for appeal and this
Court need not address it.
Moreover, the argument plainly fails on the merits and should be rejected.
Utah's reciprocal attorney fee statute applies "when a contract creates 'an unequal exposure
to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees,' [and is applied] to ensure that both
parties are subject to the attorney fees provisions." Giusti, 2009 UT 2, at f77 (quoting
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ^19, 160 P.3d 1041); see also Jones, 2009 UT App 196,
at ^[5. The statute is designed to equalize circumstances when the contract gives only one
party the right to claim attorney fees. McQueen was not faced with "an unequal exposure" to
the risk of attorney fees. To the contrary, the Promissory Notes provided for attorney fees
payable only to McQueen. (R. 3608, 3612) As for the Purchase Agreements, no party has a
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right to claim attorney fees. For those reasons McQueen's argument based on § 78B-5-826
should be rejected.4
D.

Other Attorney Fee Arguments.
L

Trust Deed.

McQueen also contends the Trust Deed (R. 3622-3627) supports his claim and
that fees should be awarded under the Trust Deed for two reasons. First, he says this action
sought to extinguish the debt secured by the Trust Deed and therefore it affected the security
or the rights of McQueen. (Aplts. Br. at 47.) McQueen cannot demonstrate how this action
affected the security of the Trust Deed or the rights or powers of McQueen. The District
Court rejected the argument for that reason. (R. 3908) The District Court also found PC
Crane did not "fail to make any payment" under the Promissory Notes, and for that reason as
well the Trust Deed provision did not apply. (R. 3908) For the same reasons this Court
should affirm the judgment below.
Second, McQueen argues he opposed unsuccessfully the Court's Order
requiring McQueen to accept full payment of the Promissory Notes and to reconvey the Trust
Deed.

In essence, McQueen's position is even though the District Court concluded

McQueen had no grounds for refusing to accept full payment of the Promissory Notes and
refusing to reconvey the Trust Deed (R. 2757-2760), McQueen should be given attorney fees
for taking that position. The argument is without merit and should be rejected.

4

The only case McQueen cites in support of this argument is Hooban v. Unicity
International Inc., 2009 UT App 287, 220 P.3d 485. McQueen fails to note that the Utah
Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case on January 20, 2010. See Hooban v. Unicity,
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ii.

Guaranty.

McQueen also claims attorney fees under a Guaranty dated April 14, 2005.
(R. 3849)

The Guaranty does not apply unless there is a default on the underlying

instrument, Le. one of the Promissory Notes.5 (R. 3849) As shown above no such default
occurred. Therefore, McQueen had no basis to seek payment from the guarantors and no
grounds to now claim attorney fees under the Guaranty.
iii.

Chase v. Scott.

McQueen contends the case of Chase v. Scott,200l UTApp404,38P.3d 1001
supports his claim for attorney fees under the Promissory Notes. (Aplts. Br. at 45-46) For at
least two reasons this argument has no merit. First, the language of the fee provision in
Chase is materially different from paragraph 3.1 of the Promissory Notes. The provision in
Chase reads: "In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." Chase, 2001 UT
App 404, at ^5. As described above, the Promissory Notes in this case require: (1) a default
and (2) enforcement action by McQueen, neither of which occurred.
Second, in Chase the contract that was the subject of the litigation was the
same contract which contained the attorney fee clause. Here, the Purchase Agreements were
the subject of the action below, but McQueen seeks attorney fees under the Promissory Notes
and the Trust Deed. The Court should reject this argument as without merit.

225 P.3d 880 (table) (Utah 2010).
5
The Guaranty only covered the second of the two Promissory Notes addressed in
McQueen's appeal. (See R. 3849 and 3611-3615)
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iv.

Implied Covenant.

Finally, McQueen contends the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
supports his claim for attorney fees. (Aplts. Br. at 44 n.30). McQueen argues PC Crane filed
suit to "escape" the payments required by the Promissory Notes which it alleges is a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id) McQueen's argument fails on
the express language of the Purchase Agreements and the Promissory Notes, as shown above,
and the implied covenant cannot rescue him. Moreover, it is well established in Utah law
that the covenant "cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to which the
parties did not agree — " Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertson 's, Inc., et al, 2004 UT 101,
^f45, 104 P.3d 1226. McQueen's argument would require this Court to add new language to
the Purchase Agreements and/or the Promissory Notes to which McQueen and PC Crane did
not agree. Accordingly, this argument should be rejected as without merit.

POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S
AWARD OF SANCTIONS.
A.

The District Court's Order Does Not Satisfy Rule 37 and Should be
Reversed.
Rule 3 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the award of sanctions

for certain discovery violations. McQueen's Motion sought sanctions under Rules 37(b)(2),
37(d), and 26(g). (Addendum 1.) Neither the District Court's Ruling entered April 29,2009
nor its Order of June 23,2009 specifies which Rule of Civil Procedure the Court relied upon.
(R. 3911-3915,3933-3936) Neither one made a finding that PC Crane's conduct warranted
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sanctions under any of those Rules. Therefore, the Ruling and Order fail to satisfy the
requirement that a District Court make "a factual finding that the party's behavior merits
sanctions." Kilpatrick, etal v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., etai, 2008 UT 82, ^[23,199 P.3d
957. PC Crane respectfully requests this Court to reverse that part of the Ruling and the
Order which awarded discovery sanctions against PC Crane.
The District Court did not make a finding legally sufficient to support any type
of discovery sanction. The Court did not find that PC Crane had "fail[ed] to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery" as would be required for sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2). Utah
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); Hales v. Oldroyd, e/a/.,2000UT App 75,^19,999 P.2d 588. TheCourt
did not find that PC Crane failed to serve discovery responses under Rules 33 or 34, as would
be required for an award of sanctions under Rule 37(d). Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d); Coxey v.
Fraternal Order of the Eagles, 2005 UT App 185, f3, 112 P.3d 1244. The District Court
also did not find PC Crane made a "certification" in violation of Rule 26(g) in connection
with any discovery response. (R. 3911-3915,3933-3936) Instead, the District Court simply
ruled as follows:
The Court finds that Plaintiffs position on March 26,
2008, that the trailer had never been built, was inconsistent with
Plaintiffs' previous position that the trailer had existed, there
was just no documentation regarding the trailer. Based upon the
inconsistency of Plaintiffs position, the Court holds that
sanctions are appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions.
(R. 3913-3914) After all of McQueen's complaints, the only mistake the District Court
found was that PC Crane's later position was "inconsistent" with its prior position,
(R. 3913-3914)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This Court should rule that the finding of the District Court is legally
insufficient to support an award of sanctions. The Court reviews "the legal sufficiency of
factual findings . . . under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to
the trial court." Kirnballv. Kimball, 2009 UTApp 233, f 14,217 P.3d 733. When reviewing
the impositions of sanctions, this Court must first "ensure that the district court has made a
factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, at f 23.
Sanctions are warranted when: (1) the party's behavior was willful, (2) the party acted in bad
faith, (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party, or (4) the party has engaged in
persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. Id. at ^|25.
If the District Court makes such a finding, the choice of an appropriate sanction
is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge. Coxey, 2005 UT App 185, at f 5; Morton v.
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997). Because trial courts must deal first
hand with the parties and the discovery process, they are given broad discretion regarding the
imposition of discovery sanctions. Coxey, 2005 UTApp 185, at^|5; Morton, 938 P.2d at 274;
Utah Department of Transportation v. Osguthorpe, et al, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). The
trial court will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82,
at 1J23; Morton, 938 P.2d at 274; Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6.
It is important to note that the term "fault," being "a general term included
within a list of more specific terms," is given a meaning analogous to the other terms within
the list. Therefore, "fault" must "involve intentional behavior." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82,
at 133.
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Here the District Court did not find, nor could it find, that PC Crane failed to
respond to a discovery request, failed to obey an order to provide discovery, or failed to
properly certify a discovery response. The District Court also made no finding of willfulness,
bad faith, fault, or persistent dilatory tactics on the part of PC Crane. The Court simply
found an "inconsistency" and then awarded a minimal amount of attorney fees. Because PC
Crane diligently tried to respond to McQueen's numerous discovery requests, even a small
amount of sanctions is unacceptable and PC Crane challenges the award by this CrossAppeal. Because the District Court made no such finding the award of sanctions should be
reversed.
B.

Discovery Regarding "Custom Designed Trailer," Put in Context.
The majority of McQueen's discovery surrounded the reference to a "custom

designed trailer" in a document PC Crane submitted with a loan application. The issue was
marginally relevant at best, but it dominated discovery for over a year and then became the
focus of McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions. McQueen pursued this discovery
ostensibly as a defense to PC Crane's claims for failure to deliver goodwill. The focus on the
trailer issue illustrates that McQueen misunderstood those claims.
PC Crane alleged that McQueen failed to deliver goodwill in the form of
customer relationships, as required by the Purchase Agreements, because: (a) McQueen did
nothing to solidify those relationships with PC Crane; (b) McQueen himself did not have a
business relationship with most of his crane customers, Stam did; and (c) McQueen
concealed Stam's true role in the business and his long term relationships with the customers.
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McQueen was convinced that discovery on the trailer issue would develop a winning defense
to the goodwill claims - if PC Crane collaborated with Stam between October 2004 and
March 2005, then it must have known of Stam's true role before March 2005. So McQueen
feverishly pursued discovery of "collaborations" about a trailer for the 300.
Thus, the trailer discovery which led up to the first discovery order, the Order
on Motion to Quash and Motions to Compel entered November 2, 2007 (R. 1096-1099),
sought documents which would show the timing of such collaborations. McQueen's
arguments at the hearing of September 5, 2007 likewise focused on the timing of
collaborations. (R. 4001, T. 29-31) PC Crane's discovery responses made clear that (a) the
collaborations occurred in late 2005 or early 2006, long after PC Crane learned on its own of
Stam's true role in the McQueen business; and (b) there were no documents reflecting the
collaborations, which consisted of simple discussions between Stam and Paul Belcher.
However, based on "independent information''not disclosed to PC Crane at the
time, McQueen remained convinced that the trailer referenced in the loan application was in
fact the Fontaine trailer which Vern modified for use with the 165 in March 2005. McQueen
thus tried to force the proverbial square peg into a round hole, i.e. to prove that the Fontaine
was in fact the "custom designed trailer" and that the "collaborations" actually occurred in or
before March 2005. Therefore, McQueen's second round of discovery, which led to the
Court's second discovery Order entered March 20,2008 (R. 2081-2085), was directed at the
modification of any trailer by PC Crane. McQueen's arguments at the hearing on March 4,
2008 likewise focused on the modification of trailers, i.e. that the "custom designed trailer"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

referenced in the loan application and the Fontaine were one and the same. (R. 4002,
T. 10-11) Judge Dever's ruling also focused on "whether or not it was the same trailer — "
(R. 4002, T. 66) Following the second Order, counsel went back to PC Crane for more
information on the collaborations and learned that the "custom designed trailer" was never
ultimately built, because the need to down rent the 300 disappeared as the business grew.
McQueen believed PC Crane had been lying all along and filed the Second
Motion for Sanctions. At the hearing on that Motion held March 31, 2009, PC Crane's
counsel Paul P. Burghardt explained that because discovery requests had focused on whether
documents existed, a miscommunication occurred:
If I made one mistake it was in [not] earlier asking my client
more questions about the 300-ton trailer. . . . I did not and I
admit today that it is my fault for not asking the question, was
that trailer ever built? Is it red? Is it blue? Is it green? I didn't
ask those questions.
(R. 4003, T. 101) At first McQueen's discovery requests had focused on the existence of
documents that may show the timing of collaborations between PC Crane and Stam. As the
focus shifted to the modification of any trailer, counsel for PC Crane learned the "custom
designed trailer" was never built, and promptly notified McQueen.
This new information resulted from a simple miscommunication, which
McQueen repeatedly characterized below in these terms: a "horrendous abuse" (R. 4003,
T. 77), a "charade" (id.), a "deception" (id., T. 108), "outrageous" (id.), "patently false
statements" (Addendum 1, McQueen Memo at 9), and "intentionally obstructing discovery."
(Id.) McQueen himself acknowledges those are "offensive words." (Id.) Yet his Brief on
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this appeal continues the accusatory language about PC Crane and its counsel: "dishonest"
(Aplts. Br. at 12), "patently frivolous" (id. at 13), "perversion of the legal process" (id. at 27),
"gross misbehavior" (id. at 28), "series of lies" (id. at 29), "admittedly a lie" (id. at 39),
"baseless, false position" (id.), "contrived falsehood" (id. at 40), "palpably wrong, dishonest
behavior" (id.\ and "shocking case." (Id. at41.)6 Despite McQueen's contentions, however,
the District Court found it was merely an "inconsistent" position. (R. 3914) This finding is
not legally insufficient to support an award of sanctions, and the Ruling and Order should be
reversed.
There are sound policy reasons for requiring a specific finding that a party's
behavior "merits sanctions." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, at ^23. Information often develops in
bits and pieces during discovery, and the state of facts at one point in time might easily be
seen as inconsistent with the facts when viewed later in time. Utah's standard is designed to
avoid imposing sanctions for innocent or even negligent mistakes. The party's actions must
be "willful," in "bad faith," or involve some other kind of "intentional behavior." Id. at ^[33.
If a merely "inconsistent" position were the only requirement, the majority of cases in the
district courts would justify discovery sanctions. Clearly that is not what Rule 37 and Utah
case law contemplate.

6

It is important to note that the District Court awarded sanctions only against PC Crane, not
its counsel. Yet McQueen's Brief is replete with accusations directed at PC Crane's counsel.
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POINT IV
ALTERNATIVELY, THE AMOUNT OF SANCTIONS
AWARDED SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
If this Court holds the District Court's finding was sufficient to support
discovery sanctions, then the amount of the award should be affirmed. The review of a
sanctions award follows a two step process. First, the Court ensures that the District Court
"has made a factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions." Kilpatrick, 2008
UT 82, at ^[23. This was addressed in Point III above.
"Second, once the factual finding has been made, we will only disturb the
sanction if 'abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown."' Id. {quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274)
(emphasis original). This deferential review recognizes that trial courts must deal first hand
with the parties and the discovery process. Id. {quoting Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6.)
Based upon his finding as quoted above, Judge Reese determined to award
McQueen his reasonable attorney fees "in conjunction with bringing the Second Motion for
Sanctions only." (R. 3914) Judge Reese made clear that the scope of this award was very
limited:
As the Court held above, it is not interested in reconsidering
Judge Dever's previous rulings and will not award sanctions for
any motions upon which Judge Dever already ruled. Defense
counsel shall submit an affidavit to prove the amount of his
reasonable attorney's fees within ten (10) days of this Ruling.
As noted above, the affidavit should only detail attorney's fees
associated with preparing and arguing the Second Motion for
Sanctions. No other attorney's fees will be awarded.
(R. 3914) The amount then awarded was $7,475. (R. 3934)
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The District Court is "granted a great deal of deference" in determining the
amount of a sanction. Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, at f23. To prove a trial court abused its
discretion an appellant must demonstrate "either that the sanction is based on an erroneous
conclusion of law or that the sanction lacks an evidentiary basis." SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.,
et aL, 2008 UT App 31, ^[14, 177 P.3d 629 (quoting Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650
(Utah Ct. App. 1997)). In that case, Comtrol asked for dismissal of the plaintiffs case or in
the alternative an order preventing plaintiffs use of certain documents at trial. Id. at ^15.
Given the breath of discretion afforded to the trial court, this Court held that the selection of
the lesser sanction was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
McQueen's appeal fails to show a clear abuse of discretion by the District
Court. Given that Judge Reese found only an "inconsistency," and not bad faith, willfulness,
or other intentional conduct, it follows that the amount of his award was comparatively small.
McQueen points to nothing but his own dissatisfaction to suggest that the amount of the
award was an abuse of discretion. McQueen does not argue an erroneous conclusion of law
nor does he suggest the District Court's award lacked an evidentiary basis. See Comtrol,
Inc., 2008 UT App 31, at ^14. Accordingly, his challenge should be rejected.7
It is also important to note that McQueen's Motion asked for dismissal of the
case as a discovery sanction. (See Addendum 1.) The jury found in favor of McQueen on all
of PC Crane's claims (R. 3316-3320), which rendered the Motion moot.

7

Because

There is no authority for the argument that this Court should "lighten McQueen's burden"
simply because Judge Reese did not preside over the case during discovery. (Aplts. Br. at 27)
Utah case law consistently requires showing a clear abuse of discretion. Moreover, it was
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fees ; instea< 1 < )f < list nisss il (R 4003. ' I ' 80) Now he contends 'the amount awarded was not
enough. On appeal McQueen seeks a greater award that will effectively pay him the attorney
fees that were denied in the three other Motu>n> nk.ii w.^ ;f. • district Court, (R 2359-2380,
3 Ir 7 7 -3 51 4, 3 842-3 849; R ,. 390 4 3910 3 i 11 3915).
If there were grounds to impose discovery sanctions, the District Court's
determination -if me amount should be granted a great deal of deference" and should be
affirmed. Moreover, no attomey fees shwulo ix* awarded to McQueen on this appeal

THE AMOUNT OF COSTS AWARDED WAS IMPROPER.
R ulc 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "speaks of'costs,' but does

reqi lired to be paid to it ic: con n t ai id to witnesse ,. and lot '• a* • w liich the statutes authorize to
be included in the judgment." Frampton v. W 1/SOIL 6(b P. 2d " 7 I.. 774 ('T "iah ! c srr- "There
is a distinction to be understood between the legitimate and taxable VOM

a.ni »'ii.er

costs." Id. While deposition expenses are allowed under certain limited circumstances, costs
for serving subpoenas are not properly taxable as cosh hi; see also Lloyd's Unlimited v.
Nature's Way \)u*k<:hh^. Lut

* .. •

-

;,.

, r i'>*w.

McQueen, not PC Crane, who souuht Judge Dever's recusal
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The District Court awarded as costs all of McQueen's expenses associated with
the depositions but did not award subpoena expenses. (R. 3959)
A.

Depositions.
"The general rule regarding the recovery of deposition costs is that a party may

recover deposition costs as long as 'the trial court is persuaded that [the depositions] were
taken in good faith and, in light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the
development and presentation of the case."5 Young v. University of Utah, 2000 UT 91, f6,
16 P.3d 549 (quoting Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d
1042, 1051 (Utah 1984)). A party must show that "the deposition was used in some
meaningful way at trial o r . . . the development of the case was of such a complex nature that
the information provided by the deposition could not have been obtained through less
expensive means of discovery." Young, 2000 UT 91, at f7.
In Young, the trial court awarded costs for the depositions of the hospital's own
employees taken by the plaintiff, and for the deposition of the plaintiff taken by the hospital.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the award for the hospital's own employees holding that
"there were other methods of acquiring the information contained in the depositions. For
example, the hospital could have interviewed the doctors prior to trial." Id. The Court also
reversed the award of costs for the hospital's deposition of the plaintiff because the
deposition was not used at trial in a meaningful way. Id. at f 11.
In this action the District Court awarded $400.60 for McQueen's deposition of
his own accountant, Kelly Banyard.

Like the deposition expenses for the hospital's
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employees i«i J <"/"<>, [|HS inlormaiinii could have been nhlainrd ilimiif'li an inli n i n s < \illlli

f •

TcQueen also did not use the Banyard deposition at trial.
The District Court also awarded $928.95 in costs for McQueen's depositions of

Jason K, Nelsen (PC Crane's former counsel) and Courtney Belcher (wife of Paul Belcher)

t -

- • • ) i - i n a v^ouii excluded the testimony of Jason Nelsen as irrelevant in an Order in

Limine, (R. 3264-3268) Accordiimh. lhev were not "used in some meaningful way at trial,"
and were n o t otherwise necessary i«>. •*., KW * J o p m e n t of the case. Young

it

L,

I u i[ ;

The District Court also awarded $442.1 u m deposition costs for the second
depositions of Paul Belcher. David Belcher, Vernon Belcher, and I .on Stai n, which w ere
taken exclusively on (he MibjeU ol n ai Icr modifications, i liese depositions were not used at
-* •

,s

i n t < "mini i"M hiilntllir majonlN nl'lhr i videmv on 1 li, it suh|ci I h it'.^Nilvi

on Moiion in Limine Re: Trailer Modifications. (R. 3269-3272)
For those reasons, this Court should rediu ^ the District Court's award of costs
by the amount of $ 1, 7 71 65, whicl i is the total of tl le deposition expenses refei enced abo v e.

COM J CSION
For the reasons set forth above. PC Crane respectfully requests !hi> Court urule as follows. I he Com tshould ailirmtli^khUi. wi McQueen's Motions lor. .uo;ue> s-ee^

reverse the award of discovery sanctions lor lack of a finding to support them. Alternatively,
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the Court should affirm the amount of the sanctions awarded. The Court should also reduce
the amount of costs awarded as explained above. The Court should award no attorney fees or
costs to McQueen on this Appeal.
DATED this 3

day of May, 2010.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

THEW C. BARNECK
PAUL P. BURGHARDT
Attorneys for Appellees and Cross-Appellants
PC Crane, LLC, et al.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
IHF.RHBY CKRTIFY that two true and c« meet copies ofthe foregoing Brief of
Appellees and Cross-Appellants, plus searchable CD, was served byfirst-classmail, postage
prepaid, on this v-^ day o! Ma}. 2(H. < - the following:
Bruce A. Maak. ksq
• H . .. . >•. i-ns>
185 South State Street. »7n<",
Salt Lake City, UT 841 i.
Attorneys for Appellants and Cro^^-ippellees

PARR WADDOIIPS BROWN
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niuce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Viorneys for Defendants
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
!
Lake City, Utah 84111
.ucphone: 801-532-7840
Fax: 801-532-7750

mi III inn mi iiinn ni \ i i n s i lint ni i o n i i m ni< \ ui i i \ M < I n i < i ' il
STATE OF UTAH

j'C CRANE, LLC, a L'tal, hm.lLu ua'on.
company, LACY, LLC, a Utah limited
liabilin compam. DAVID PALI
'• 1IER, VERNON BELCHER, PA I
* u>HH CH^R.'nd-ichr 1 -

SECOND MOTi
SANCTIONS

•t

Plaintiffs,
vs.
McQUEEN MASONRY , INC., a I Itah
corporation, CENTRAL EQUIPMENT,
L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
McQUEEN CRANE SERVICES, LC\ a
Utah limited liability company, JAMES
McQUEEN, an individual,

C -

jiuhv

. • ".

M;I:

1.. A. Dover

Defendai its.

:x_i .

',._..

-.ov move 11

:

• •: n - •

A-

26(g). \ Hah Knir - of i 1\ d Procedure, to dismi^ with nieiudiec planitiiTs" Complaint in tl lis
action because of the conduct of plaintiffs a:..: i:i. ....;:;.

: - * misrepresenting m;- :\K

to the Court. ' " ) misrepn'ser<tm» ?nn*crial farts \o McQueen, (iii) disobeying this Court's
Discover) Urdci an*: ;.

im .h ;;,-, ,ck ^\ oi>)ecu<ai.s i^ discovery requests,

A Memorandum in Support of this Motion accompanies this pleading.
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McQueen also seeks an award of its attorneys fees to be established by affidavit at the
appropriate time. The attorneys fee award is addressed with other requests for attorneys fees
relief in a separate motion being concurrently filed by McQueen.
DATED this

£ 4

day of June, 2008.

aak, Of Counsel
^ADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants
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HARDS BRANDT M1LI-ER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
299 South Main Street <?• m : 15013
V O. Box 2465
Salt Lake € i u , I ! **U 10-2465
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Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-532-7840
Fax: 801-532-7750

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PC CRANE, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company, LACY, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, DAVID PAUL
BELCHER, VERNON BELCHER, PAUL
DAVID BELCHER, individuals,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SECOND MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
McQUEEN MASONRY, INC., a Utah
corporation, CENTRAL EQUIPMENT,
L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
McQUEEN CRANE SERVICES, LC, a
Utah limited liability company, JAMES
McQUEEN, an individual,

Civil No. 060915007
Judge: L. A, Dever

Defendants.

This should have been a simple case to prepare for trial. As things have turned out,
however, McQueen has spent far more in discovery disputes requiring plaintiffs ("PC") to
respond than McQueen has spent in all other aspects of case preparation. The discovery disputes
have focused on McQueen's effort to prove that PC was heavily involved with Stam before the
second crane transaction in April, 2005, contrary to the consistent position taken by all of PC's
principals that no substantive communications occurred in that period of time.
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At the last discovery hearing, McQueen asked tnc i. -un ;,, hinx* i-\. u.- sut ;-1v
information about a trailer that PC claimed had been modified in collaboration with Stam,., which
McQueen believes occurred in March and early April, 2005. The Court forced PC to supply
a dditional infor mation andallovs depositions to betaken. That information and those depositions
establish that PC and its counsel 1 lave engaged in yet another effort to frustrate the discovery
pmeess ami m puipi ns/h uiisiepieseril muter hi I I tin Is In Mt< hiecii -mini fn this (lmn1 on ilie sulked
of that trailer.
i * i -.. iL J =/ * *±>Al •**"* >**J L1 >!. **» U i / i ^ i 1 1 ^ ' * i U*M i ^ •' > i ' i *±}Lt% v * * _ */_. i

u

* . - * * i.' *JA*_A*T *4 .J I'iliK r

In a document given to its lenders. PC stated the following:
une oi ule upcia*
>n. ui<u wu aiiu l.uii coliuborateu v n
was in the building of a c
jiu-d trailer that gives us the ability to
use our 300-ton hydraulic I.iebhcrr crane as either a 100-ton crane o- .i
Uo-ton eraik This is th primary reason for the drastic increase in the
mnual revenue production o\ tlm machine

The crawler cranes are the next business endeavor that we are
• :i-ipMratiiiLr with I ,on to undertake [Exhibit 1].
Documents obtained from Bank of American Fork when the Court refused, to quash P ~"
subpoena demonstrated tl: lat the ,ccrawlei ei ai ies' "' busii less ei ydeavoi occui red in lati ,: ,

-

hence, the building of a custom designed trailer necessarily occurred before the end of 2005,
McQueen then sent its I bird Set of Interrogatories and Requnsi lloi I'timim i

tnjiitr'.iiini1,

information ^ubvrnmg date:> of umstnu f IM--. <»j the trailer an.d wh(> participaled in ••:
modification.

;

hied a patently in vol-..u.- ,-•!>;_ <„ L . ..

...,-;, rv^ucu *:ujeainb .* . ; :;;

"overly broad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant" and refused to respond. I PxhiHi

: ^ laak

sent Burghardt an email August 10, °.007 explaining the obvious relevance <•: th, ;n:• .rnuiion
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and requesting production. [Exhibit 3] Burghardt responded by letter stating that prior to April,
2005, "PC Crane and Mr. Stam had no communications or interaction concerning the subject
trailer." [Exhibit 4] On August 13,2007 Burghardt emailed Maak saying that he would respond
to the interrogatories if they were limited to the period between October, 2004 and April, 2005.
[Exhibit 5] Maak emailed Burghardt indicating he was unwilling to limit the time period to prior
to April 2005. [Exhibit 6]
McQueen moved to compel responses to the Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests on
August 7, 2007. In its response filed August 30, 2007, PC stated: "Even though plaintiffs
believe the records concerning the subject trailer are not relevant to the issues in this case, they
are willing to respond to the Discovery Requests if limited to the relevant time period of October,
2004 to March, 2005." PC requested that the Court limit McQueen's discovery to the period
prior to March, 2005. [Exhibit 7, p. 5] At the hearing before the Court on McQueen's Motion to
Compel, Burghardt stated as follows to the Court: "[TJhere was a document produced by us that
made some reference to Mr. Stam and PC Crane collaborating on a trailer. This trailer. Your
Honor, as we certified in a letter, this collaboration occurred much after the purchase of the
fourth crane in April of 2005. It was well into the year 2006." Later he stated, uThe trailer
wasn't even conceived of until the year 2006 between Stam and the Belchers. At that time, a
year and a half after they purchased the first cranes, there clearly is no relevance to their
collaboration on this trailer." [Exhibit 8] This Court on November 2,2007 entered an Order on
Motion to Quash and Motions to Compel, which required production of all documents relating to
the trailer prior to December, 2005. fl| 2(e)] In response, Burghardt sent Maak a letter stating
that "plaintiffs have no responsive documents." [Exhibit 9]
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M c Q u e e n then sent his Fourth Set o f Interrogatories and Request for Production, which in
iMMyrr.i- - u .

"

•--

• <-^

:

"

leek trailers timlit owned n

the trailer variety

that was modified •, P< objected to the request that it was i>\ e»- b: oad .induh burdensome, and
seeks irrelevant m i. ' 'J iJ ia,i

Hi » i i „

11 F

"„ ,

Exhibit I0 1 ' Vf "! )ec< mb< a 7 2007 Maak : v\ rote Burghardt

observed that the Court had ordered production oi documents relating to the trailer prior to
I >eceinl>ei\ <!0h \ .null dial he li ul iiidepeiuk iilh vciifii (I llv i \istent r oi lhij liailei

Hi staled

We intend lo seek sanctions if the documents relating to this trailer and i:uanswer to luteiTOgatory N o . A are not immediately forthcoming. When we
do, and when this matter plays out. w e do not want you or your client l He
able to say that there w a s some innocent mistake made, V ou and yoiu
client arc on notice that the trailer in question was made and titled during
the time period for which production w a s o r d u e d in the Court. If these
documents arc not produced now, in response to this very pointed request,
;, ,^;u K,, ^i e or u i a i tV^A/ }1(T^> K-on mtr!f'*M) *!i\ w i|l ihe^d [Exhibit 11]
Burghardt responded, drawing a diM.inelu;n between the original m.tnuiacture ol the subject
,,.!!i;i

I..M

5

.*Ulil\eMeU i i : J ( . ( i i m o u j ' i -

inanulactured earlier the Court's Order addressed "the manufacture of the eustomr/eo uanei
Burghardt stated thai PC had no documents relating lo tin mamiiiielun* ol lln: ''custom designed
trailer'5 prior to 'December 2005." [Exhibit 12]
McQueen filed its ' I hird Motion U * ( '( >mpe. uu iJuwi-.jv. . - - oo - seeking pi- .m
the withheld information

In us response p r stated that it objected to the request "because it

sought information outside ui ihe scope oi discovery auiL . * .; .„. - - ...

...a

.u

iiie

period prior to December 31, 2005 — and that McQueen's seeking such information to ensure
that PC was not hiding documents was improper, [Exhibit 13, pp. 12-13]
In brielinf, it? Tl ud Motion to Compel,. McQueen supplied additional information
demonstrating that PC modified a trailer in the March-April, 2005 time frame and asked the
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Court to force PC to produce and respond to the interrogatories aimed at that issue. At the
argument of that Motion, Mr. Barneck stated as follows:
[T]he Court said, in its Order - and we — that's what we're going
by — in paragraph 2(e) it says, "All documents created prior to December,
2005 concerning the design, production, and manufacture or construction
of that certain custom designed trailer."
Your Honor, there aren't any documents and Counsel can believe
there are until the cows come home, but that won't create documents that
don't exist Did they collaborate? Yes, they did. What was the time of
that collaboration? I don't know. I don't agree with Counsel's assertion
that because the next paragraph says the next business endeavor means
that it was the next one in chronological order? I don't know what they
meant by that. But they did collaborate and there just aren't any
documents.
Mr. Barneck continued:
PC Crane wanted a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to
create one. This was for a different crane. It was for the 165 Liebherr.
The other one that Counsel's complaining about from the loan documents
was for the 300. Different crane.
[Exhibit 14]
The Court entered an Order on Third Motion to Compel and Motion to Impose Sanctions
requiring PC to supply all documents reflecting work done to modify any drop deck trailers
owned by plaintiffs prior to December 31, 2005 and to allow McQueen to depose PC's principals
on the subject of work done to modify any drop deck trailer. [Exhibit 15] In response to that
Order, Burghardt sent Maak a letter dated March 26,2008 in which PC completely changed its
position on the subject trailer — instead of continuing to assert and certify that the "subject
trailer" had been built long after December, 2005, PC now took the position that "THE
TRAILER... WAS NEVER ACTUALLY BUILT'! [Exhibit 16] In other words, once the
Court allowed discovery that would demonstrate that the "subject trailer" was in fact modified in
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March and April, 2005, P r changed \IK. posiuuii lual a had been o:riii> :ng ana repic*. - o. »
( Court and to McQueen for 7 months from the claim that the "subject trailer'' was r idilicd in
2U06 to the position that the trailer was never built at all McQueen invites the Coun > re\ iew
I';H"1] of" PC's

statements nhove, nil of which m: irreconcilably inconsistent with the notion that

the modified custom trailer claimed by PC to have effected a "dramatic increase in. [its] annual.
* •- v'nu\: ' ncvci a^iuaiiy OXISIJd.
The recent depositions of the Belchers and Stain make crystal clear that the trailer

Exhibr I - "a custom designed trailer thai gives [PC| the ahilin u* use our *()U ion
either a 3uo ;

a<

»:*•,,..

,>i

*'

.Tune as

- ! :•*!

Exhibit l wonW nnvi> 10 In; modified su that it could earn, more wvighl because the
counterweigh; ^.ed *....

; .••. ton, crane are heir. *«-.< •.». . .. those used foi a 165 toi i ci ai le.

[P. Belcher Depo pp ^ '>\ w> i~M 1 )?nr Rrlchcr testified that PC has only modified one trailer -a 1996 Fontaine Hailci. which ^as modified through the adJiiuat. * . ..f\- „ A\\C ana -. .iin^u;^ n<
axle spacing of the other two axles so that the trailer could carry .more weiphi

| > > H< ^fur

Depo pp 4 ; , 12] Dave Belcher also testified that the modified i onuune trailer could be used
to carry counicruem.liis loi huifi tin- M±U ion an*!iil?:.lyjL. ••*-*•-' ,iJ* Belcher Depo,, pp.. 8-11]
Vern Belcher testified that PC has built only one custom designed trailer — the 1996 Fontaine
step deck trailei , which was purchased .March 9, 200.5. [V Belcher Depo, , pp. 5-6] and that the
modifications added a third axle and changed axle spacing so that the trailer could carry more
weight [V. Belcher Dej >o.? f -p 6 7]. S 'eiii. Belcher testified that the modifications to the Fontaine
trailer were effected by PC before the trailer was taken to Premier Truck and Trailei ••* ih *\ oi\
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on or about April 8, 2005 - that is, the modifications were effectuated between the purchase date
of March 9 and April 8, 2005. [V. Belcher Depo., pp. 13-14, Ex. D] Stam testified that the
modified Fontaine trailer could haul counterweights for both the 165-ton and 300-ton cranes, and
that the modified Fontaine trailer was in fact used with counterweights for the 300-ton crane.
[Stam Depo., pp. 8-9]
So, the evidence is as follows:
(1)

Paul Belcher gave banking institutions a document stating that PC had

significantly increased its revenues through collaboration between PC and Stam in
designing and building a custom designed trailer which allowed the use of both a 165-ton
and 300-ton crane configuration. That language makes absolutely clear that PC was
stating that the modified trailer was in fact constructed because PC claimed that its
construction allowed PC to increase its usage of the cranes.
(2)

PC only built one custom modified trailer - the 1996 Fontaine trailer that

was modified between March and early April of 2005. That trailer was modified so that it
could carry more weight. As Belchers and Stam testified, in order for a trailer to carry
weights for either the 165-ton or 300-ton cranes, a trailer would have to carry more
weight. The Fontaine was modified in exactly the way that PC testified a trailer would
have to be modified to service both the 300-ton and 165-ton cranes, and it was in fact
used with both the 165 and 300-ton cranes.
There is no doubt that the trailer that Paul Belcher stated in Exhibit 1 to his lender was modified
in collaboration with Stam was in fact the trailer that was modified in March and April, 2005.
But PC had a problem - PC and PC's counsel had been maintaining in
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correspondence with McQueen, responses to discovery, and statements to the Court that the
modified trailei \ vas bi lilt in 2006 and was "ii relevant" becai ise it was outside the "rele > ant
period", Because the only modified trailer was built squarely in the relevant time period —
{

\

IJ

•

•

•

i *•

^

|

M

'i

* < ty.*

:^n\

-:

•-•

! <difled trailer was evei fnnU aHc- Decembei 31 ?0(r>. renders each objection to -;iscnverv
baseless and each statei tieiit and suggestioi

' tnd "h IcQi ic en that the si ibject trailei

existed or was modified in 2006 a falsehood Tlu* course ol events makes clear that tin*, was riot
an innocent iui-Likv.

it was a purpose n.L .;;^:i u, p:\ • . K .-.i/ii^.i./'iii L^o\a.!h nigi-r

damaging evidence.
ARGUMENT
Rule 37(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes sanctions when, among other
things, a party fails to obey the Court's order to provide discovery [Rule 37(b)(2)]; in addition,
the I Itali Appellate Courts have held that Rule 37(d) "allows a court to impose sanctions against
a party for disregarding discovery obligations even when that party has not directly violated, a
C

.
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585 (UT App 1 °90) Sanctions are appropriate once the court limb; "wilfulness, bad fait! •*
fi. .'
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E.g., Mart*»// ' \mtinental Baking C V). ;MHP 2d 27 \ \ I 1

.

: *

•

M

. v .

sK

) • -u addition. Rule 2"ig)

provides tl lat a la\ \ yer's signati u e on a discover} response 'constiti ites a certification that
(1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for tl ic
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) notinicipu^cdim au> uiipiuj^i puipu^.,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and
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(3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive

"

The Court is presented with an egregious case of a party and its counsel (i) filing
objections to discovery that are baseless if no trailer was modified (as they now claim), (ii)
making patently false statements to opposing counsel concerning the existence and time frame of
existence of the subject trailer, (iii) making patently false statements to the Court concerning the
existence and time frame of existence of the subject trailer, and (iv) disobeying this Court's
Order dated November 2, 2007, which required production of documents bearing upon the
modified trailer. This is not the first time that PC and its counsel have engaged in this gameplaying approach to discovery; about two-thirds of the Court's file concerns this very problem.
The Court has been extraordinarily patient with this behavior. This time, however, PC and its
counsel have been caught red-handed, making false statements to the Court, to counsel, and
intentionally obstructing discovery.1 Yes, those are offensive words. But they are regrettably
accurate, based on PC and its counsel's very own words.
What is the appropriate sanction? The only fair sanction is a dismissal with prejudice of
PC's Complaint. How fair is it that PC should be allowed again and again to intentionally
obfuscate and hide evidence that disproves its case and then, when caught red-handed, be
allowed to escape with no penalty? This is one of many such instances in this case. The Courts
have sustained the sanction for dismissal under far less egregious circumstances. E.g., Morton v.

l

These behaviors are all not only violations of the U.R.C.P., but professional violations as
well. Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct, precludes a lawyer from knowingly making any
false statement of fact to a tribunal or failing to correct a false statement previously made. Rule
3.4, Rules of Professional Conduct, precludes a lawyer from "obstructing] another party's access
to evidence" and "fail[ing] to make reasonable diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request by an opposing party." How can these duties be squared with Buxghardt's and
Barneck's statements to McQueen's counsel and the Court that are outlined above?
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Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (UT 1997) [wilful failure to comply with discovery order];
Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P,2d 410 (UT 1964) [failure to produce records in response to
order]; Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App. 127 [failure to produce records and obstruction of the
discovery process]. PC's behavior has been dishonest and intentional, and has had the effect of
(1) making McQueen's discovery largely ineffective and (2) extremely expensive. Enough is
enough.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

£ 4 ~ day of June, 2008.

c, Of Counsel
/ADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SECOND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS was served this Q}\& day of June, 2008 by hand
delivering on said date a copy thereof, addressed to:
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq.
Paul P. Burghardt, Esq.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
299 South Main Street, Suite 1500
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
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